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Abstract 
Research on foreign policy change claims leaders seek to restructure their country’s foreign 
relations when internal and external opportunity structures are permissive. But a number of 
prominent efforts at achieving change have occurred during times of considerable domestic 
upheaval and rigid international constraints. To understand why, this article examines three 
well-known cases of Cold War foreign policy change, focusing on the external relations of 
Charles de Gaulle in France, John G. Diefenbaker in Canada and Willy Brandt in West 
Germany. These cases suggest that domestic upheaval and foreign policy change were 
inextricably interwoven, and that efforts to effect strategic change on a grand scale were 
motivated by a desire to respond to the demands of marginalised domestic constituencies 
without incurring the costs of domestic reform. Our analysis suggests key moments of 
international change are best understood as domestic incorporation strategies rather than 
instances of significant and principled foreign policy change. 









Why have some of the most prominent efforts to undertake foreign policy change taken 
place when international and domestic constraints are at their highest? France’s Charles de 
Gaulle, West Germany’s Willy Brandt and Canada’s John G. Diefenbaker each sought to break 
out of the US-dominated bloc system during the Cold War at times of intense domestic 
upheaval at home. These efforts were, on the aims the leaders set out, largely unsuccessful. 
French independence turned out to be a chimera and France continued to benefit from the 
American nuclear umbrella. Ostpolitik was an important contributor to détente but Brandt’s 
efforts did not diminish West Germany’s dependence on the West. And Diefenbaker proved 
unable to reorient the Canadian economy away from the US and focused instead on symbolic 
spats with the Kennedy administration and outward expressions of support for détente.  
It is not the incompleteness of these efforts then that should be surprising, given that they 
took place against the backdrop of the ‘hot’ Cold War of the 1960s (Cox, 1990: 32; Lebow, 
1999) and rising societal conflict (along multiple fault-lines) at home. Rather, research on 
foreign policy change struggles to explain the very fact that these efforts took place in the first 
place. In this literature, permissive opportunity structures both externally and within the state 
are seen as a prerequisite for undertaking major foreign policy change (Gustavsson, 1999; 
Siverson and Starr, 1990: 48; Welch, 2005). While second-image perspectives focus on the 
need to build a coalition of support at the domestic level - bureaucratically, politically, 
societally - in order to effect change (Hofmann, 2013; Holsti, 1982), first-image accounts 
highlight the need for permissive external structures of power to bring about change (e.g. Hyde-
Price, 2004: 110). Most scholars would suggest some combination of favourable opportunity 
structures both internally and externally is necessary for change to occur (Cladi and Webber, 
2011: 208-210; Hermann, 1990: 12; Welch 2005: 45-46). Either way, these opportunities need 
to be in place for change not to represent strategic folly either in the international system or 
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vis-à-vis domestic opponents. So then why have some of the most prominent examples of 
foreign policy change taken place at the seemingly most inopportune times? 
In this article we argue the reason lies in the domestic benefits of undertaking strategic 
change. External renewal offers a useful response to crises of legitimacy which emerge from 
the breakdown of state-society relations: the inability of the political system, and especially its 
dominant political parties tasked with linking society to the state, to satisfy a variety of social 
interests, and the pervasive sense of a growing gap between the values the state embodies and 
the aspirations of domestic constituencies. Strategic change is able to satisfy marginalised 
constituencies that their interests are informing the policies of the state without overly 
disrupting existing patterns of interests. Indeed, strategic change incurs few direct costs for 
leaders because it relies upon signals and metaphors rather than the transfer of resources. Put 
differently, key strategic concepts are sufficiently broad to allow diverse groups to project their 
own expectations onto them, the concept of the ‘national interest’ provides a unifying force 
domestically, and external constraints on the government’s action can be cited to explain away 
any lack of success.  
Our argument helps to explain why external change occurs so often during times of 
domestic upheaval rather than during those times in which consensus might be more easily 
constructed. It also helps to explain why these efforts are enacted under constraining external 
environments, since what appears as costly international action is, in fact, not costly at the 
domestic level for which it is primarily intended. Moreover, there is a ‘second image reversed’ 
component to the argument, since we show that constraining international environments can 
actively help achieve domestic aims by giving policymakers more credible excuses for why 
substantive changes failed to materialise (e.g. Gourevitch, 1978: 882). And our argument helps 
to explain why efforts at foreign policy change are seldom as successful as their lofty intentions 
would predict, since the aim is to reincorporate domestic peripheries rather than to 
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fundamentally alter the state’s position in international affairs. As we demonstrate, very often 
the principal achievements of foreign policy changes are to be found in the quieting of 
discontent at the domestic level. 
The article proceeds as follows. The next section outlines a theory of foreign policy change 
based on the domestic incorporation of peripheralized constituencies, an endeavour particularly 
effective when attempted as strategic change under constraining structural conditions like Cold 
War bipolarity. We incorporate insights from framing and political entrepreneurship theory to 
a complement our theoretical framework which operates primarily on the intersection of IR, 
FPA and comparative party politics. After explaining the logic of our comparative design, we 
present our three case studies of change in French, West German and Canadian external 
relations during the Cold War. The final section discusses both conceptual implications and 
ways that the insights of the analysis can apply to contemporary cases of foreign policy change. 
 
A Theory of Domestic Incorporation and Foreign Policy Change 
Prominent examples of external change during the Cold War took place at times of 
unprecedented domestic upheaval whose magnitude went beyond the limits of conventional 
political representation and in one of the most dangerous periods of the conflict. How and why 
do such crises of domestic legitimacy bring about demand for foreign policy change? And why 
is change attempted under such difficult external conditions? To understand these questions, it 
is necessary first to understand how traditional forms of representation break down and how 
the interests of the state can become de-linked from those of society more broadly; and, 
secondly, why foreign policy change, particularly under constraining structural conditions, is 
an appealing way to address these gaps between society and state. 
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In the pluralist view of the state, which lies at the basis of much FPA theorizing, the state 
is a cypher for particular domestic interests. In democratic systems, the actors who are 
supposed to ensure that the state’s interests ultimately reflect those of the citizenry are political 
parties (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). But it has also long been 
acknowledged, although often neglected in foreign policy literature, that the state has its own 
interests distinct from those constituencies it seeks to represent. These interests include both 
its own survival and continued conformity with norms of governance (political and economic) 
that are constitutive of legitimate authority in international society (REFERENCE 
ANONYMISED); as well as maintenance of the state’s independence – and the security of its 
resources – from its domestic society (Skocpol, 1979). Moreover, the dynamics of the selection 
process ensure that, in practice, most political actors (parties included) are competing for the 
support of a sub-set of society, whose particular interests they will thus seek to promote (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
There is, therefore, an internal contradiction in the role of parties. Parties are supposed to 
represent society, but they also become entangled with the interests of the state. Over time, 
dominant parties come to be interwoven with the state, controlling (indirect) patronage, 
appropriating state resources, and colluding with other parties to maintain their 
monopolistic/duopolistic position. This is particularly pronounced in advanced industrialised 
democracies in the last 40 years, where parties have ceased to represent societal interests 
upwards towards the state and have instead become absorbed into the state itself, disciplining 
society into accepting its policies through a process of ‘cartelization’ (Katz and Mair, 1994). 
Cartelization denotes a cyclical process of incorporation, renewal and institutionalization of a 
representative system whose features include the institutional fusion and absorption of political 
parties into the state, and the depoliticization of party competition through the ideological 
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convergence of state-close parties in order to crowd out policy options that could contradict the 
interests of the state (see generally Katz and Mair, 2009, 2018; van Biezen and Kopecky, 2014).  
This state-party nexus is accompanied by a pattern of inclusion and exclusion towards 
different constituencies. Political systems contain internal peripheries that are little or not at all 
represented by that system’s policies or prevalent values system (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). 
Domestic peripheralisation can take the form of systematically under-represented ideological 
and political positions (REFERENCE ANONYMISED), regional socioeconomic 
discrimination (e.g. of the industrial working class and its locales under post-industrialization 
today, see Gest, 2016), or inter-generational exclusion (e.g. Sloam and Henn, 2019). The state-
society gap can be ideological or symbolic: groups will not feel unrepresented only in terms of 
their material preferences, but also in terms of the state’s discourses and values (Laclau, 2005). 
When these divisions reach a level of intensity or salience that they challenge the ability of 
existing governing arrangements to continue, we may speak of a failure or crisis of 
incorporation: a concurrent exacerbation of the material and cultural gaps between state and 
society that the existing party system finds it increasingly difficult to accommodate.  
The need to address crises of incorporation creates opportunities for new political actors to 
enter the fray while calling upon existing elites to draw upon support from the periphery to 
bolster their position. In practice, the reincorporation of peripheries takes the form of co-
optation rather than displacement, achieved by actors associated with the party-state – often 
leaders of major parties that have been excluded from power for long periods of time – rather 
than genuine outsiders. These actors have a comparative advantage in mobilising support, since 
they may draw on the considerable material and symbolic resources of the state when doing so 
(e.g. Mintrom and Luetjens, 2017). Such individuals, which we term ‘insider-outsiders’, hold 
the requisite combination of political capital and credibility to both incorporate the 
effervescence of peripheralized, excluded constituencies and remain within the confines of 
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ideological competition of the state-party nexus. Their primary aim is to reconcile state-society 
relations without undermining or imposing direct costs on powerful constituencies underlying 
the party-state nexus. 
Insider-outsiders take on the role of foreign policy entrepreneurs (e.g. Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis, 2012; Frohlich et al. 1971: 18-20; Macdonald, 2015; Mazarr, 2007; Mintrom and 
Norman, 2009; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). They are entrepreneurs both in the sense of 
identifying domestic political openings to pursue new foreign policies, and perceiving 
international structural constraints as an opportunity structure to reshape state-society relations 
within limits that match their own political interests. Unlike more traditional foreign policy 
entrepreneurs, however, they are rooted not within the bureaucracy but within the broader 
political environment (e.g. Carter et al., 2004; Carter and Scott, 2009) and their strategy is more 
public facing as a result. Insider-outsiders come to power on the basis of novel foreign policy 
rhetoric and, once there, focus on implementing this agenda. In this sense they are close to 
‘mercenary entrepreneurs’ who “view foreign policy entrepreneurship as politics by other 
means” rather than ‘revolutionary entrepreneurs’ who wish to bring about foreign policy 
change for its own sake (Marsh and Lantis, 2018: 219). The question then becomes why 
entrepreneurs motivated by domestic goals choose to focus on external relations, especially by 
pursuing foreign policy change?  
Defined as a tangible departure or reversal of previous patterns of policy that goes beyond 
incremental or procedural shifts (Goldmann 1988: 10), foreign policy change tends to emerge 
at moments of perceived crisis in the state’s external environment (Gustavsson 1999; Hermann 
1990: 13). Foreign policy change differs from foreign policy restructuring, the wholesale 
reorientation that usually reflects and demands a substantial redefinition of the material terms 
of state-society relations at home (Holsti, 1982). Foreign policy change need not encompass 
the totality of the state’s international orientation (Goldmann, 1988; Gustavsson, 1999), but 
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can concern a specific area of its external relations such as its strategic and security orientation. 
Being often an event of high salience and symbolical value, foreign policy change usually 
becomes a landmark of domestic politics (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 639). All this makes 
foreign policy change an attractive option for addressing domestic crises of incorporation. 
Domestic reform is costly and often threatens the primacy of concentrated interests whose 
support is still required in order to govern. In addition, the accumulation of rents over time by 
powerful sectors reinforces their domestic dominance, making it all the more difficult to 
overcome entrenched interests (Pierson, 2000). Aspects of external policy, too, suffer from the 
same problem, since foreign policy choices - economic openness, alliance ties, organisational 
memberships - have redistributive consequences at the domestic level (e.g. Gaddis, 1982; 
Gourevitch, 1986; Moravcsik, 1997; Rogowski, 1989; Trubowitz, 1998). This balance of costs 
and benefits is one reason, we argue, why individuals seeking to repair domestic rifts so often 
focus on external relations, and especially strategic change as a type of foreign policy change. 
Strategic change provides political actors with a broader canvas to demonstrate their 
reformism: as the state redefines its position and purpose vis-à-vis the dominant lines of 
competition permeating the international structure, it can present this structure as something 
that itself needs to be overcome. Counterintuitively, it is this ostensible firmness of the 
international structure that makes it a resource and opportunity for insider-outsiders at times of 
domestic crises of incorporation, one reason why efforts to achieve domestic change during the 
Cold War focused so heavily on the external environment. For, as theorists of two-level games 
have long observed, external constraints on a government’s action can be a useful means of 
shifting conditions of domestic possibility (Putnam, 1988). 
Several aspects of strategic change make it a helpful tool for incorporating peripheral actors 
into the party-state nexus without damaging existing patterns of interest representation. First, 
 9 
the distributional implications of strategic change at the domestic level are lower than in other 
domains of external actions, such as foreign economic policy or trade, meaning fewer domestic 
sectors are exposed to targeted costs. Second, strategic change can be achieved through 
signalling changes in alliance or resolve like the articulation of new phrases or concepts (like 
the ubiquitous ‘pivot’) or the movement or re-designation of military capabilities, neither of 
which involve significant direct costs. Third, since the grammar of strategic change is broad 
and ‘essentially contested’, concepts associated with strategic change like ‘security’, 
‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’ can act as empty signifiers onto which various constituencies 
may project their interests and values (Laclau, 2005). Fourth, because external strategy is 
premised upon the national interests and necessarily involves confronting external threats, it 
offers a unifying discourse associated with a ‘rally around the flag’ effect (e.g. Mueller, 1973: 
209) which can (at least partly) ameliorate domestic divisions. 
Because strategic change is undertaken for the purposes of managing domestic 
constituencies, it is also framed in specific ways by those leaders seeking to bring it about (e.g. 
Beasley, 1998; Garrison, 2001, 2007; Kaarbo, 2008; Lantis and Homan 2019). Framing, 
understood as “a discursive strategy used to construct meaning in relation to events occurring 
in the world around us” (Aran and Fleischmann, 2019: 617), is necessary to signal that a change 
in strategic orientation has taken place. Different frames can help actors to identify specific 
threats (Chaban et al., 2019), specify appropriate comparisons (Khong, 1992; Oppermann and 
Spencer 2013), convey the level of risk involved (Levy, 2000; Maoz, 1990: 88-90), and 
organise the representation of facts (Kaarbo 2008: 68). They are therefore a crucial aspect of 
how foreign policy changes are represented domestically. And, significantly, they not only 
represent objective external changes to different audiences, but are rather constitutive of them 
(Aran and Fleischmann, 2019: 614). In other words, framing is not only a form of 
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communicating strategic change, but is also a way of establishing that a given set of moves 
actually constitute a change of strategy in the first place. 
We argue strategic change intended primarily for domestic audiences are framed in a 
number of highly specific ways. In particular, the examples of strategic change we focus on 
are all framed in a manner which makes them amenable for domestic consumption. First, a 
number of individual decisions are discursively framed as a single overall package of reforms. 
Without these labels, these individual moves might not even attract the attention of domestic 
constituencies. Second, they are accompanied by a new visualisation of the state’s role in 
international affairs based upon changes in national role conceptions (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012) 
and its ‘imagined geography’ (e.g. Hagen, 2003). The country, according to common variants 
of such rhetoric, is shifting away from established alliance partners, into new and flexible roles. 
Third, these new roles are communicated to domestic audiences as entailing benefits to ‘the 
nation’ or ‘the people’ rather than specific constituencies or interests. By keeping the discourse 
at this more ambiguous level, political actors are able to broaden the appeal of their message 
to a greater number of domestic constituencies (Meibauer, 2020). Often these changes are sold 
in terms of the initial demands of marginalised peripheries. The rhetoric accompanying them 
emphasises not their strategic benefits, but their role in national renewal. 
Our claim is not that these changes are always purely symbolic, simply that they are 
motivated by a concern to transpose costly domestic reforms into less costly strategic ones. In 
many cases strategic change has provided both a symbol of reform for domestic peripheries 
and discernible real-world developments in the state’s international orientation. Equally, in 
other cases, attempted changes may fail to produce any practical results at all. Ultimately, 
whether these attempts result in practical policy change or not, what appears as costly 
international action is, in fact, not all that costly at the domestic level: since the signalled 
foreign policy changes never achieve their maximum goal – the realignment of the international 
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structure away from bipolarity – the international costs are not incurred. Over the longer-term, 
of course, change may be significant, since even minor strategic shifts can have considerable 
path-dependent effects, not least given the importance of discourse and identity in framing 
subsequent (foreign) policy choices (e.g. Aran and Fleishmann, 2019: 618; Blyth, 2002; 
Katzenstein, 1996; Schmidt, 2008). 
 
Methodology 
In the three sections that follow we set out three cases of attempted foreign policy change 
under inopportune internal and external conditions. We examine, in turn: (1) Gaullist strategy 
in France, (2) Diefenbaker’s external relations in Canada, and (3) Brandt’s Ostpolitik in West 
Germany. Each of the three cases fits the criteria we set out to investigate at the beginning of 
the article: They are all examples of attempted foreign policy change during times of domestic 
upheaval and an international context not conducive to alteration by such medium sized states. 
The research design is confirmatory, insofar as the aim is to study cases which fit the scope 
conditions of the theory in order to establish the dynamics motivating foreign policy change 
(Levy, 2008). While the cases do not vary significantly on these attributes, the presence of 
similar dynamics across each of the cases helps increase our confidence in the theoretical 
model. However, lower-level variation between the cases - in the manifestation of domestic 
crises and the partisan affiliation of the leaders involved - does help us establish that the 
specified theoretical dynamics apply across different contexts, although they may play out in 
different ways, as we discuss below. 
Our argument is that the presence of societal divisions was not unrelated to the question of 
subsequent strategic change but rather played a significant part in establishing demand for 
foreign policy renewal. And we argued that such changes were articulated by individual 
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entrepreneurs who were able to simultaneously extract resources from the state and credibly 
portray themselves as outsiders to the political process. To show this, the cases offer a 
structured-focused comparison which traces the emergence of foreign policy change efforts 
within the context of the respective domestic political environment. The study is structured 
insofar as it asks specific questions of each case (Where did the impetus for foreign policy 
change come from? Which actors was it instigated by? How was this change framed? How 
successful was it? What were its longer-term effects?) and focused in that it emphasises specific 
aspects of the historical cases and does not seek to set out in detail every process which 
influenced the politics of the time (George and Bennett, 2005). If our theory is accurate, we 
would expect to establish clear evidence of domestic demand for foreign policy renewal, an 
emphasis on external change by those seeking to benefit from conditions of domestic crisis, 
these efforts being framed in terms of the interests of those excluded from the political process, 
little evidence of meaningful change in the material position of the state, and longer-term 
beneficial effects of change on the stability of state-society relations. Where these conditions 
obtain, it is reasonable to infer the predominance of domestic crises in motivating foreign 
policy change. 
 
Gaullist Strategy in the Fifth Republic: Colonial Problems and Cold War Solutions  
Foreign policy in the French Fourth Republic (1944-58) was stymied by a combination of 
institutional inefficiency and popular disagreement over France’s role in the emerging Cold 
War. Although Communist participation in government until 1947 prevented France from 
anchoring itself explicitly to the Western camp, given the extent of French economic and 
geostrategic dependence on the US, and its position in Europe, this was effectively the only 
viable option. In any case, the tripartiste PCF-SFIO-MRP coalition came to an end in May 
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1947 when PCF ministers were dismissed from the government, and economic assistance from 
the US laid the foundations for reconstruction and for the modernisation of French economy 
and society (Imlay, 2009: 506). Strategic alignment followed suit: In early 1948 efforts to reach 
a defence treaty with the UK were stepped up and on 17 March France joined the organisation 
that would become the Western European Union. Formal talks on an Atlantic pact began in 
July 1948, leading to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 (REFERENCE 
ANONYMISED). 
The construction of an Atlanticist framework for French security was an elite, and partisan, 
endeavour. Although strategic necessity pointed in this direction, domestically the views of 
centrist elements was crucial in pushing through an Atlanticist vision of French security, since 
the Communists and Gaullists each advocated greater independence than these ties would allow 
for. And these views had considerable support among the population: France had a strong 
Communist party, the PCF, committed to struggle against capitalism and friendly relations with 
the Soviet Union (Bell and Criddle, 1994: 40; Guiat, 2003: 59-60). The Gaullist RPF, also a 
highly significant political force, emphasised grandeur and national rehabilitation in its more 
‘realist’ worldview (De Gaulle, 1971: 136; Hartley, 1971: 28), but was in any case similarly 
opposed to France throwing its lot in with the US. The upshot was that French anti-
Americanism was a force on both sides of the political spectrum (Harrison, 1986: 175-176) and 
that tying France to the West was only made possible by carefully excluding the Communists 
and Gaullists from power (REFERENCE ANONYMISED). 
Over time the Fourth Republic and its foreign and security policies became associated with 
specific interests and with the partial representation of the French body politic. Coalitions were 
constructed at the expense of those parties representing the regime’s initial sources of 
legitimacy, communism and Gaullism, since these movements rejected key aspects of the 
American-dominated Western order. Governing coalitions comprised elements from the 
 14 
centrist liberal and Christian Democratic parties, the most prominent of which was the MRP 
(Einaudi and Goguel, 1952) and smaller conservative parties like the Radicals and the 
Independents, and at times the socialist SFIO, which was “fundamentally reformist in scope”, 
advocating state intervention “within the context of a mixed economy” (Hanley, 1986: 114). 
While these parties disagreed on a number of domestic questions - not least on ecumenical 
matters - on foreign policy questions they were supportive of both European integration and 
the Atlantic alliance (Irving, 1973: 160). When the ‘Third Force’ broke down in early 1952, 
over the specific question of state funding for Catholic schools, but also in response to growing 
divergence on economic and foreign policy questions between the parties (AUTHOR 
REFERENCE), a series of unstable centrist coalitions took its place, continuing the broader 
aim of maintaining foreign policy continuity by excluding Communist and Gaullist elements, 
though the combined support of both groupings was a substantial minority (close to 50 per 
cent) in early 1950s (Giles, 1991: 69; Rioux, 1989: 122, 151). 
The ostensible partiality of these governments was reinforced by economic cleavages. 
Liberalism created winners and losers, and – as a result – political resentment. The recovery 
plan drafted in 1947 (the ‘Mayer plan’) outlined a more liberal view of the French economy 
which would by definition come at a cost to hitherto protected sectors. Moreover, the 
acceptance of the Marshall Plan of American aid in 1948 contributed to the gradual 
liberalization of the French economy, both because of pressure from the US to remove 
economic controls and open the economy to trade, and because the disbursed funds allowed 
the government more discretion to forego controls in the first place (De Long and Eichengreen, 
1991). The PCF was most adept at directing resentment towards the bourgeois political system, 
but Gaullists too were keen to emphasise their support for workers in sectors losing out from 
liberalisation (Rioux, 1989: 157, 185).  
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There was thus a broader legitimacy problem faced by the Fourth Republic, as governments 
excluded political groupings on the left and right who claimed to speak for constituencies not 
benefiting from the unequal effects of economic development. Governments, to be sure, were 
brought down by a number of issues, including the colonial crises in Algeria, Indochina and 
Morocco. But the broader crisis of legitimacy was always an important factor in the 
background, both stemming from – and contributing to – the problems of governing. The 
downfall of the Fourth Republic came in mid-1958, and while the proximate cause stemmed 
from events in Algeria, the fact that sizable constituencies failed to identify with the Republic 
helped seal its fate. The demands from many on the right for an end to the Fourth Republic, the 
decisions of those acting on its behalf in the investiture of De Gaulle, and the response of the 
public to the General’s seizure of power were all suggestive of broader concerns with politics 
in the Fourth Republic than the system’s inability to deal with the crisis in Algeria. 
Upon taking power the watchword of De Gaulle’s reforms was ‘renewal’; of the political 
system, the nation, and the country’s position in the international order. The early years of the 
Fifth Republic are known for the turnabout in Cold War strategy effected by De Gaulle, which 
was comprehensive in its efforts to articulate a more independent posture, seeking to balance 
American influence through engagement with the East. In January 1963 De Gaulle declared 
that France’s nuclear weapons would be directed tous azimuts (against all), and he began to 
publicly criticise the American-led war in Vietnam (calling for ‘neutralization’) as well as 
beginning to restrict purchases of French companies by American business (Kuisel, 1993: 159). 
From the mid-1960s contacts with the Soviet Union increased, culminating in a visit to Moscow 
in June 1966 (Rey, 2010: 26). Efforts were also made to break with the institutional structures 
of the West. De Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application to join the EEC in 1963, on the grounds 
that the UK would act as a Trojan horse for American interests, and in March 1966 he 
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(in)famously broke with the NATO organised command – a move nonetheless short of full 
withdrawal (Martin, 2011). 
While the seeming withdrawal of France’s commitment to the Atlantic alliance was a 
headline grabber, the Gaullist strategic reorientation did not in itself live up to the significance 
with which it was often associated. For one thing, France, America, and the Soviets, knew that 
France was not sufficiently strong to fulfil the significant global role it had set out for itself. 
Nor, of course, was an alliance with the USSR ever a credible option, thereby limiting De 
Gaulle’s ability to play both sides off against one another (Imlay, 2009: 509). The Soviets, for 
their part, were keener to deal with the US and Germany, giving France relatively little 
influence (Trachtenberg, 2011: 189). Moreover, France continued to benefit from the 
credibility of the American deterrent, since it never formally left the Alliance (only the 
integrated command structure), and since the United States had the same interest in defending 
France from any potential Soviet intervention or assault. Because Western security during the 
Cold War was indivisible, the United States was never in a position to credible threaten to 
abandon its West European allies, regardless of their position within the West’s security 
architecture. 
More valuable was the contribution the discourse of a resurgent French nation gave to the 
forging of a domestic consensus around a new identity. As Cerny has argued, “French 
withdrawal from the integrated NATO command in 1966 not only vastly complicated the whole 
issue of West European defence but also became central to domestic French political 
consensus” (Cerny, 1990: 15). The same could be said for the discourse of French nuclear 
independence, which was “significant primarily for its symbolic dimension”, leading to 
concerted efforts to disguise Franco-American nuclear cooperation in later years, since this was 
integral to maintaining the domestic consensus constructed around Gaullist independence 
(Cerny, 1990: 151). Rather than defining “vital French national interests”, therefore, Gaullist 
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ideology was valuable because it “helped to cement a strong centre-right coalition in France, 
which permitted…successful domestic economic and political reform” (Moravcsik, 2012: 59). 
The creation of the Fifth Republic and the rhetoric of Gaullist independence helped bring 
about a more inclusive French identity and to ground a period of relative political stability 
which would last for decades and would be favourably compared with the instability of the 
Fourth Republic. Beyond the specific crises in Indochina and Algeria, the latter of which 
precipitated the regime’s eventual downfall, questions of legitimacy persisted, not least because 
the Republic excluded politically ostensibly anti-system elements which nonetheless 
represented sizable segments of the French population. De Gaulle was able to create the 
circumstances for this transformation because his role as resistance leader and his reputation – 
as well as the distance he kept from political organisations bearing his name – allowed him to 
speak more credibly on behalf of the nation prior to assuming the presidency. The 
establishment of the RPF, and De Gaulle’s distance from it, allowed him to play an influential 
role in the politics of the Fourth Republic while avoiding the trappings of partisanship. 
  
Prairie Populism and the Liberal Backlash: Diefenbaker’s Cold War 
Canada was inextricably linked to the US by dint of its geographic contiguity and thus 
firmly aligned with the Western system during the Cold War. Following unprecedented 
coordination during the Second World War, by the 1950s high-level political-military contact 
between the US and Canada had become institutionalised in various formats, principally 
through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Meanwhile, 
commercial ties between the US and Canada grew at an exponential rate during the 1950s, 
spurred on by the flurry of American investment in Canada after the war and encouraged by 
the Liberal governments of Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent (Tanguay, 1999: 97).  
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But the extent of interdependence between the two countries belied growing political 
divisions between ‘continentalists’ favouring strong relations with the US and those who 
believed Canada should follow either a more independent path or should prioritise its relations 
with the United Kingdom. Anti-Americanism peaked at the fringes of politics, meaning 
elements of the right and the left decried the continentalism of the post-war decade, while those 
at the liberal centre were more predisposed to view the American connection favourably 
(Campbell and Christian, 1996). For a sizable constituency of individuals close ties with the 
US were to be resisted, on the grounds that these reinforced American hegemony over Canada, 
contributed towards the intensification of the Cold War, threatened to undermine Canadian 
industries, and heralded the decline of Canada’s social and political model (Granatstein, 1997).  
Unsurprisingly, preferences on continentalism were also informed by economic factors. 
Ontario and parts of Quebec possessed a near monopoly of financial, corporate and political 
power and accounted for much of the country’s industrial heartland (McCready and Winn, 
1976: 71-73). The Western and Atlantic provinces – more rural, more sparsely populated – 
were dependent on the centre both for capital and for political representation. Governments in 
Ottawa, however, were popularly viewed as having served the interests of Central Canadian 
businesses at the expense of the more peripheral regions. One of the principal manifestations 
of this regional bias was the question of tariff reform. The western provinces, dependent on 
imported machinery and sensitive to the global market for grain, essentially absorbed the costs 
of maintaining high tariffs to protect industries of Central Canada (McCready and Winn, 1976: 
84). Traditional parties were also accused of prioritising the interests of financial elites on ‘Bay 
Street’, who welcomed American investment, over and above the interests of rural Canada or 
other sectors. 
Both the Liberals and Progressive Conservative parties were guilty of this kind of bias, but 
since the Liberals had governed uninterrupted since the end of the War, they were more 
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vulnerable to charges of pro-Americanism. The perception of the Liberals as the party of 
Central Canada thus increased over time, reinforced by Conservative opposition to various 
cross-border issues, including the infamous ‘Pipeline Debate’ of 1956 which saw the Tory 
opposition capitalise on Liberal efforts to ram the American-funded TransCanada pipeline 
legislation through Parliament. Criticism of Liberal continentalism peaked with the election of 
John G. Diefenbaker as leader of the Progressive Conservatives in December 1956. A self-
confessed prairie populist, Diefenbaker railed against the Liberals for having sold out Canadian 
interests, running on a nationalist and anti-American platform that ultimately led him to victory 
in the 1956 federal election (ibid: 81). 
Diefenbaker was an outsider even within his own party, and this helped him to staple his 
anti-elite identity. His status as a geographic ‘outsider’ meant he encountered “considerable 
resistance among the core-based rulers within the Conservative party” (McCready and Winn, 
1976: 72). His role as a credible representative of the periphery acting within the party machine 
enabled him to work towards the incorporation of the Canadian periphery into the core of 
Canadian politics. Through his ‘symbolic patriotism’, Diefenbaker likened his opponents as 
“servants of American interests” (ibid). He was successful because he was able to capitalise on 
growing anti-Americanism and the resentments from those in the periphery towards deepening 
dependence on the American economy. In his addresses to American audiences, moreover, he 
was keen to emphasise that: “Canada is not a country that can be taken for granted or a country 
that follows whatever the United States does, regardless of whether it is beneficial to Canada 
or not” (Nash, 1990: 52). His electoral programme was premised on the notion that Canada had 
to be defended against American economic domination and he promised “to make a clear stand 
in opposition to economic continentalism”, stressing the need for “a national policy to provide 
a dynamic influence on the economy, and a sense of national purpose and national identity” 
(Diefenbaker, 1976: 9-10, emphasis in original). 
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Having promised to reduce Canada’s dependence on American finance, Diefenbaker did 
make a number of attempts in office to address the issue. He protested frequently to President 
Eisenhower, for instance, about the damage resulting from the Americans offloading surplus 
grain onto the Canadian market.1 Efforts were also made to rebalance the Canadian economy 
away from the US and towards Europe and the Commonwealth. But these policies were either 
unsuccessful or pursued with very little vigour, and a common complaint from the left was, 
that, while they agreed with Diefenbaker’s policy of diverting trade away from the US, the 
government’s implementation of this agenda lagged far behind its rhetoric (Carrigan, 1968). 
The Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations was instructive. Diefenbaker feared that further tariff 
reductions would cement Canadian dependence, but when Finance Minister Donald Fleming 
informed the Americans that Canada’s support for further liberalisation would not be 
forthcoming, the negative US response convinced Diefenbaker to change his mind and re-
instruct Fleming to support the proposals (Nash, 1990: 150). 
The domain in which the Diefenbaker government did precipitate a seeming turnaround 
was the realm of Cold War defence and security, not economics or trade. Interestingly enough, 
this was not an issue that featured prominently in the election campaign, nor in the ostensible 
conflict between core and periphery, but it did offer an opportunity to distance Canada from 
the United States symbolically, in a domain where change would not bear electoral 
consequences. As Glazov has argued, “Diefenbaker’s anti-American posturing in the period 
from 1961 to 1963 lead to a softer Canadian position on the Cold War” (Glazov, 2002: 77). 
This position involved talk of disarmament, weaker support for US positions (as with the 
delayed Canadian response during the Cuban missile crisis) and more frequent denunciations 
of American actions. Tellingly, direct engagement with the Soviets themselves was limited, 
                                                             
1 Memorandum of conversation between Diefenbaker and the US Ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, 
Ottawa, 22 June 1957 
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and the new approach to Cold War strategy was articulated almost entirely through Canada’s 
interactions with the US and in meetings with its NATO allies. It was therefore more of a 
rhetorical challenge than a substantive one.  
And while discord in US-Canada strategic relations during the period did have negative 
consequences for the relationship (and for the credibility of the Atlantic alliance), these never 
came close to constituting any kind of full break between the two allies. Indeed, in spite of the 
rhetoric of greater ‘distance’ from the Americans, Diefenbaker signed NORAD into existence 
during his first year of office. Whilst most of the discussion over NORAD was conducted by 
the previous Liberal government, Diefenbaker showed no hesitation in acquiescing to the 
creation of an institution with a significant sovereignty cost when it was clearly of strategic 
necessity. Rather, his ire – and much of his political posturing – was reserved for largely 
symbolic issues, as was the case with Canada’s decision not to purchase nuclear warheads for 
the country’s Bomarc missiles, a decision that would precipitate both a crisis in US-Canadian 
relations as well as the eventual downfall of his government.  
Ultimately the Diefenbaker government was brought down by a combination of fractious 
infighting within the Tory ranks and their leader’s ongoing spat with Kennedy regarding the 
Canadian decision not to purchase nuclear-tipped warheads for Canadian missiles. 
Diefenbaker’s decision precipitated a crisis in US-Canadian relations in 1962-63 so severe that 
the Cabinet split in their support for the prime minister (Nash, 1990: 261) and the opposition 
Liberals and NDP collaborated in a no confidence vote to bring down the government. The 
leftist NDP, which held the balance of power in the chamber, argued that while they supported 
Diefenbaker’s policy agenda, the extent of disarray in the government obliged them to vote in 
favour of the motion (Harrop, 1984: 134). 
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Diefenbaker’s rhetoric left its mark domestically, if not externally. Successive Liberal and 
Conservative administrations would do more to cultivate support among the provinces, and to 
speak for a broader diversity of Canadian interests than previously. Moreover, both foreign 
economic policy and Canadian grand strategy reflected the influence of Diefenbaker’s tenure, 
and the governments that followed him – most notably the Liberal administrations of Lester 
Pearson and Pierre Trudeau – were at pains to show their distance from the US. Strong voices 
in the Liberal party, including future Finance Minister Walter Gordon, advocated increased 
state intervention and efforts to ween control of the Canadian economy off American business 
(McCall-Newman, 1982: 14). The geo-strategic rhetoric of the Diefenbaker administration, 
therefore, while contributing relatively little to any sense of a genuine strategic shift at the time, 
served to alter the underlying basis of legitimacy on which the government was based, re-
incorporating excluded regions, sectors and societal groupings into the political mainstream. 
 
Triumphant Progressives, Accommodated Nationalists: Brandt’s Ostpolitik 
West Germany’s foreign policy reflected its founding (i.e. post-World War II) domestic 
considerations as much as its strategic ones, defined by the ascendancy of Catholic statesman 
Konrad Adenauer and his CDU party. Adenauer aimed to establish a functioning liberal 
democracy and market economy, goals linked to alignment with the West (Engelmann-Martin, 
2002). But Adenauer also knew that an unconditionally pro-Western German state would fail 
to stabilize. West Germany had received millions of German refugees from eastern Europe, 
while its citizens were energized by the demand of reunification. Faced with potential 
nationalist attacks against the new state (Glaessner, 2005: 47), Adenauer formulated a ‘policy 
of strength’ against the Soviets to bring about ‘reunification within freedom’. West Germany 
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did not recognize the communist regime in East Berlin and the new borders in Eastern Europe, 
claiming that it constituted the only legitimate German state (Clemens, 1989: 16-30).  
Aided by economic growth, CDU dominated West German politics in the 1950s. The 
legitimacy of the new state however came at the price of exclusion of the working class. While 
the liberals of the FDP, nationalist but also anti-communist, became CDU’s coalition partners 
for most of the period between 1949-1966, the social-democratic SPD found itself on the wrong 
side of all the choices of the new state. It rejected Westbindung in 1949 because it considered 
that it entrenched the national division (Tilford, 1975: 1). Challenging both the Western 
orientation and the policy of strength against the Soviet bloc in the ‘hot’ Cold War of the 1950s 
condemned the SPD to opposition and excluded the concerns of its core constituency, the 
working class, from the decisions of the state (Lehmbruch, 1968: 183). 
But Adenauer’s tenets started crumbling after 1960 when the SPD accepted the market 
economy and Westbindung. In the early 1960s Adenauer’s anti-Soviet antagonism appeared 
increasingly anachronistic and at odds with the interest of West Germany’s allies in a more 
normalized relationship with the Soviet bloc (Granieri, 2003). The erosion of Adenauer’s anti-
Communism as the legitimating basis of the West German state created new challenges for the 
regime. The Grand Coalition between the CDU and SPD in 1966-69 enlarged the state’s 
inclusivity by incorporating for the first time a non-bourgeois party, but its immobility in 
domestic and foreign policy accentuated the impression of the state’s unresponsiveness and 
exposed both major parties to challenges from their flanks (Edinger, 1970; Lehmbruch, 1968). 
The resurgence of the far right demonstrated how the conservative ideology of West Germany 
was not enough of a legitimation in light of the national division (Lehmbruch, 1968: 203). On 
the other hand, student mobilization and leftist radicalism put new social demands on the 
agenda and critiqued West Germany’s Western alignment (Shell, 1970).  
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It is with this multifaceted threat to the West German state’s legitimacy as the background 
that a coalition of the SPD and FDP under Willy Brandt took over in 1969. On the one hand, 
that coalition was a novel development, excluding for the first time since 1949 the CDU from 
government. The FDP had presented itself as the party of renewal, being the sole opposition 
party against the Grand Coalition in 1966-69. And the SPD’s participation in government with 
the CDU in the Grand Coalition, with Brandt as foreign minister, had demystified it as a threat 
to the state; but the party also maintained its image of reformism since it had previously spent 
17 years in the opposition and had never led a government.  
Both the SPD and FDP then had a vested interest in the survival of the political system and 
were committed to maintaining the key features of the West German state: its democratic 
political system, its social market economy, and its Western orientation. The new coalition 
however also knew that these elements needed renewal in light of both nationalist discontent 
and demands for reform of the state’s conservative structures by a restive younger generation, 
currents that found expression in demonstrations, student unrest, and the assertiveness of 
radical parties outside the state-party nexus (most notably the far-right NPD, barely missing 
entry into the Bundestag in the 1969 elections). 
The new government undertook the task of domestic renewal – in Brandt’s words, to ‘dare 
more democracy’ (mehr Demokratie wagen) (Pridham, 1975: 46). Interestingly however its 
work became consumed by its flagship foreign policy initiative: the new Ostpolitik of signing 
treaties with the USSR, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, accepting the legitimacy 
(although stopping short of formal recognition) of the East Berlin regime and the validity of 
post-War borders in Eastern Europe. In all these ways, the new foreign policy was undoing 
Adenauer’s policy, antagonizing conservatives, refugee organizations and nationalists. 
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Ostpolitik was a multifaceted phenomenon which allowed Brandt to appeal to multiple 
constituencies. Most obviously, the SPD-FDP coalition redefined reunification away from a 
Bismarckian statist ideal and towards a progressive societal view, as a process of human 
contacts and penetration of the communist German Democratic Republic by Western values 
(Paterson, 1975: 31). This meant that West Germany finally accepted that there were ‘two 
states in the German nation’ (Glaessner, 2005: 52-53), acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
communist regime in East Berlin for the sake of peace. This shift was accompanied by Brandt’s 
performance on the international stage, capped by his emotive kneeling in front of a World 
War II monument in Warsaw, a symbol of a new West Germany that actively repented for the 
Nazi past, as opposed to the relative silence of the Adenauer years. At the same time, Brandt’s 
energetic diplomacy and statesmanship next to Nixon, Kissinger and Brezhnev projected an 
image of a more confident West Germany. He thus managed to present what was essentially a 
concession – de facto relinquishing West German claims in the East – as a project of ambition 
and confidence, capturing the imagination of the post-War generation. 
But Ostpolitik also preserved key features of the West German state. First, while Brandt’s 
cultivation of the global climate of détente spoke to reformers and progressives in West 
Germany, it also was an extension of Westbindung (Clemens, 1989: 241; Glaessner, 2005: 
169), aligning West German foreign policy with the priorities of its allies. In this way, 
Ostpolitik updated the legitimacy of the West German state’s Western orientation in the eyes 
of its citizens at a time when many, especially the young concerned with developments like the 
Vietnam War, had started seeing it as antithetical to democracy and peace. Second, Ostpolitik 
did not relinquish the goal of reunification. The treaties signed with the USSR, Poland and 
GDR were interim documents that accepted in practice the security order, regimes and borders 
in the East (Clemens, 1989: 107-108), but West Germany still maintained its claim to a future 
permanent settlement of its national question.  
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Ostpolitik was never only a project of ideological renewal, but also spoke to the sense of 
national disenchantment that many West Germans had begun to feel with the perpetuation of 
national division during the Cold War. In this sense, Ostpolitik renewed the national credentials 
of the West German state and its Western orientation. Classical nationalists were 
accommodated by the formerly principal party of the state-party nexus, the CDU, which 
opposed Ostpolitik as a project betraying the cause of reunification and opening West Germany 
to communist infiltration (Tilford, 1975: 14; Clemens, 1989: 60). The result of this opposition 
along conservative-nationalist lines by a party that had until then been identified with the state’s 
Western orientation was that in the 1972 elections fought over Ostpolitik the CDU absorbed 
the nationalist protest vote of the NPD (Conradt and Lambert, 1974). These elections were won 
by the SPD-FDP coalition, confirming the three parties’ collective ability to absorb both the 
left-radical and right-nationalist threats to the legitimacy of the West German state. 
Finally, a key dimension of Ostpolitik was its incomplete nature, at least judged against 
Brandt’s level of ambition after his electoral triumph in 1972. The promise to resolve national 
division in a pacified Europe was frustrated by Brandt’s removal from power in 1974. The final 
equilibrium of Ostpolitik, continued by Brandt’s moderate successor Helmut Schmidt into the 
1980s, was to resolve the legitimacy question of West Germany as a democratic German state 
anchored to the West and in coexistence with its communist neighbours while the two 
superpowers retained their preponderance over Europe. The re-election of the SPD-FDP 
coalition under Schmidt in 1976 and 1980 pointed to the success of the equilibrium Brandt had 
established (one that perhaps would have been upset if Brandt had been allowed after 1974 to 
pursue an even more accommodative policy towards the Soviet bloc or a more independent 
posturing of West Germany, both bound to face resistance by segments of West German society 
and its allies). The three major parties won together almost 100% of the vote in these elections, 
crowding out any nationalist or left-radical discontent. As such, Ostpolitik’s incomplete 
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promise of overcoming German and European division ensured the incorporation in a broad 
centrist state-party nexus of new elements – the working-class basis of SPD, the post-War 
generation, German nationalists of both traditional and progressive ilk – without displacing 
older ones.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has examined cases of foreign policy change during the Cold War, focusing on 
the Gaullist revolution in French security policy, Diefenbaker’s efforts to resist American 
domination of the Canadian economy, and Brandt’s Ostpolitik in West Germany. These cases 
continue to confound theoretical expectations of those factors conducive to foreign policy 
change, since change was attempted against the backdrop of domestic upheaval and significant 
external constraint. We argued that this puzzle can be explained by recognising the role foreign 
policy change plays in responding to crises of domestic legitimacy in which state-society 
relations have broken down. These three cases illustrate how crises of legitimacy – stemming, 
respectively, from marginalisation in political, regional, and generational terms – pushed elites 
towards foreign policy change as a means of incorporating hitherto marginalised constituencies 
into the party-state nexus without disrupting existing patterns of interests. 
Our argument helps to solve a number of puzzles. It explains why foreign policy ‘change’ 
frequently emerges from domestic environments which are polarised or in which the requisite 
consensus for reform simply does not exist. These conditions are, we argue, precisely why 
elites turn to the articulation of a new foreign policy agenda and, specifically, why they focus 
on strategic change most of all. It also helps us explain why policymakers choose to effect 
change in external settings which would seem to augur poorly for the ability of small states to 
alter their strategic setting, since it stresses the importance of the domestic game and the 
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corresponding value of citing non-conducive international constraints. Finally, the argument 
explains why these efforts were largely unsuccessful on the grounds their advocates had set out 
for themselves, pointing us rather to the domestic effects - which were markedly more 
successful - as providing the principal raison d’être for these initiatives. 
Our argument has a number of broader theoretical implications for how we study foreign 
policy. First, it contributes to our understanding of the politics of Cold War foreign 
policymaking, foregrounding the importance of domestic factors. The Cold War is often 
considered a difficult environment in which to find evidence of partisan influence on foreign 
policy, and the vast majority of second-image research relies on the very decline of the Cold 
War as an enabling condition (Milner, 1998: 759), though some research has identified 
evidence of Cold War partisanship (e.g. Holsti, 1982; Fordham, 1998; Hofmann, 2013, 2017; 
REFERENCE ANONYMISED). Our argument shows that domestic factors were very much 
at the forefront of explanations for foreign policy change, but also this was only possible 
because the rationale of such change was focused on the domestic level itself. 
Second, the argument helps to broaden our understanding of how political parties matter in 
foreign policymaking. Recent years have seen a surge of research on the connection between 
parties and external affairs, focused mainly on party ideology and government-opposition 
dynamics (e.g. Kaarbo 2015; Noël and Thérien 2008; Rathbun, 2004; REFERENCE 
ANONYMISED). But far less has been written about the relationship between parties, 
societies, and the state, or on the various roles parties may fulfil in different party systems. Our 
argument suggests that a broader conception of party systems can help us understand better the 
dynamics of foreign policy change than a focus on party ideology or power alone. 
Third, we contribute to another surprisingly neglected dimension in foreign policy analysis; 
that of foreign policy change (Hermann, 1990; Welch, 2005). We showed that, somewhat 
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counter-intuitively, change often takes place at times of domestic upheaval and external 
constraint, in spite of the limiting effects resulting from the absence of conducive political 
opportunity structures. By conceptualising strategic change as a tool through which leaders can 
overcome domestic crises of legitimacy, our argument contributes to our understanding of 
when efforts at strategic change are likely to take place and why they may be more limited in 
practice than their adherents often proclaim. 
Fourth, our argument contributes to existing work on entrepreneurship and framing in 
foreign policy decision-making by highlighting the background societal conditions which 
incentivise mercenary entrepreneurship in foreign policy and the kind of individuals (insider-
outsiders) best able to perform this role successfully. It also helps us to understand the 
importance of framing when it comes to the discursive construction of foreign policy change 
and why the field of strategy is more amenable to this kind of framing than other facets of 
external relations. Our analysis thus helps to suggest new avenues of inquiry for students of 
these well-established modes of foreign policy analysis.  
Fifth, and finally, our argument can help us understand the politics of populism and foreign 
policy, currently an area of growing interest (Destradi and Plagemann, 2019; Steel and 
Homolar, 2019; REFERENCE ANONYMISED). The insider-outsiders we describe are not 
substantively dissimilar from many populist leaders today, who have similar trajectories to 
power and who equally view strategic change as a means of promoting a new identity between 
state and society. Understanding why individuals seek to manage domestic divisions with 
strategic change may help us to understand the emphasis populist leaders place on external 
policy, why their rhetoric is often loftier than their initial promises (as with the Global Britain 
discourse, for example (e.g. Turner, 2019)), and the real-world limitations on implementing 
populist foreign policy agendas (Plagemann and Destradi, 2019; Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015). 
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